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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff Appellee, 
v. : 
NEIL STEVEN PIXTON, : Case No. 20030146-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
The Honorable Ann Boyden, Judge, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
entered judgment of conviction for Driving Under the Influence (Enhanced), a third 
degree felony, on February 3, 2003. R. 91-93. A copy of the judgment is in 
Addendum A. Appellant/Defendant Neil Steven Pixton ("Mr. Pixton" or "Appellant") 
filed a timely notice of appeal on February 13, 2003. R. 99. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
AND PRESERVATION 
Issue: When the crime charged in this case was committed, Mr. Pixton had one 
prior conviction for a driving under the influence ("DUI") related crime and a second 
pending DUI charge. After Mr. Pixton was convicted of a DUI offense on the pending 
case, the state enhanced the charge in this case to a third degree felony based on the two 
convictions. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) 
allowed this charge to be enhanced to a felony even though Mr. Pixton did not have two 
prior convictions when the crime was committed? 
Standard of review. This issue involves the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44(6)(a). Questions of statutory construction are reviewed for correctness. 
Grvnberg v. Ouestar Pipeline Co.. 2003 UT 8, ^[27,469 Utah Adv. Rep. 13. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 62-70, 94-97, 112. Mr. Pixton 
filed a motion to reduce the charge to a class B misdemeanor and an accompanying 
memorandum. R. 62-70. The district court held a hearing on the motion. R. 112. 
Following the hearing, the district court denied the motion and entered findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and an order ("findings and conclusions"). R. 112:19-21; 94-97. 
A copy of the findings and conclusions is in Addendum B. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTE 
The text of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2002) in its entirety is set forth in 
Addendum C. The relevant part of Subsection 6(a) of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 
2002) provides: 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree 
felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten 
years of two or more prior convictions; 
Utah Code Ann. § 4l-6-44(6)(a) (Supp. 2002). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 25, 2002, the state filed an Information in Third District Court charging 
Mr. Pixton with an enhanced third degree felony DUI. R. 4-5. After the case was bound 
over, Mr. Pixton filed a "Motion to Reduce Charge" and an accompanying memorandum. 
R. 62-70. The district court denied the motion and entered the findings and conclusions. 
R. 94-97. 
On December 9, 2002, Mr. Pixton entered a conditional plea of guilty, preserving 
his right to appeal the adverse ruling on his "Motion to Reduce Charge." R. 78. On 
February 3,2003, the trial court sentenced Mr. Pixton to a suspended prison sentence of 
zero to five years and imposed various terms of probation including inpatient treatment. 
R. 91- 93. Mr. Pixton filed a timely notice of appeal on February 13, 2003. R. 99. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following facts, agreed to by the parties below, were set forth in the findings 
and conclusions and apply to the issue on appeal. 
1. In May, 1998, Mr. Pixton pleaded guilty to DUI, a class B 
misdemeanor, and was sentenced in the Sandy, Utah justice of the peace 
court. R. 45, 64, 94. 
2. In January, 2001, Mr. Pixton was arrested for a DUI in South 
Jordan, Utah; the case was filed as a class B misdemeanor in the South 
Jordan justice of the peace court. R. 45, 64, 95. 
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3. Mr. Pixton was arrested on the DUI charged in this case on 
May 15, 2001, while the second DUI charge was still pending in the South 
Jordan justice of the peace court. R. 45, 74, 95. The charge in this case 
was initially filed as a class B misdemeanor in the Murray, Utah justice of 
the peace court. R. 95. 
4. On May 24, 2001, after the charge in this case was filed in the 
Murray justice of the peace court, Mr. Pixton pleaded guilty to "alcohol-
related reckless driving" (ARR), a class B misdemeanor, in the South 
Jordan case. R. 95. 
5. After Mr. Pixton pleaded guilty to ARR in the South Jordan case, 
the Murray City prosecutor learned of the conviction in that case. R. 45, 
95. On December 3, 2001, the Murray city prosecutor dismissed the 
class B DUI prosecution of this charge that had been filed in Murray justice 
court, and referred the case back to the arresting police agency for 
prosecution as a felony. R. 95. 
6. On June 21, 2002, the Salt Lake County District Attorney's 
office, acting on behalf of the State of Utah, filed the charge in this case. 
R. 4-5. The State charged the Murray DUI as a third degree felony, 
claiming that the Sandy DUI and the South Jordan ARR were two prior 
convictions that warranted enhancement of the Murray DUI to a third 
4 
degree felony even though two convictions were not in place when the DUI 
offense in this case was committed. R. 4-5, 95. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding that this case was properly enhanced to a third 
degree felony DUI. At the time the crime in this case was committed, Mr. Pixton had not 
been convicted of two prior DUI offenses. Since the statute requires conviction for two 
prior DUI offenses as an element of the third degree felony DUI offense, the fact that one 
of the convictions was not entered until after the offense was committed precludes a 
conviction for the third degree felony DUI. Additionally, interpreting the statute to allow 
conviction for the enhanced offense even though a defendant has not been convicted of 
two prior offenses at the time of the crime would render the statute void for vagueness 
because a defendant would not have notice at the time the crime is committed. Because 
statutes must be interpreted to meet constitutional constraints, the enhanced DUI statute 
requires that any convictions used to enhance be in place when the crime is committed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DUI 
CHARGE IN THIS CASE COULD BE ENHANCED TO A FELONY 
BASED ON A DUI RELATED CONVICTION THAT WAS ENTERED 
AFTER THE CRIME IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED. 
Mr. Pixton had one prior DUI conviction within the past ten years when the crime 
in this case was committed. He also had a DUI charge pending, but no conviction in 
another case. The state dismissed the class B misdemeanor charge that was initially filed 
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in this case and refiled the case as a third degree felony after Mr. Pixton pleaded guilty to 
alcohol related reckless driving on the pending DUI charge. The trial court incorrectly 
concluded that this case was properly refiled as a felony since Mr. Pixton did not have 
two prior DUI related convictions at the time the crime was committed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(ii) designates a DUI offense as a third degree 
felony when a defendant has two prior DUI convictions within the past ten years. Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) states in pertinent part: 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree 
felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten 
years of two or more prior convictions; 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (Supp. 2002). 
In interpreting a statute, courts first consider the plain language of the statute. 
Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 2002 UT App 221,112, 51 P.3d 1288. In 
considering the plain language of the statute, courts "'presume that the legislature used 
each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning/" Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Svs.. Inc.. 2001 UT 29, ^ [12, 24 P.3d 928 
(citations omitted). Words in a statute that have a commonly accepted meaning should 
be given that common, lay meaning unless there is an indication that the legislature 
intended otherwise. Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co., 2002 UT App 221, <ftl2. 
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Courts consider other methods of statutory construction only when a statute is 
ambiguous. The focus in analyzing the statute remains, however, on effectuating the 
legislative intent. Intermountain Slurry Seal v. Labor Comm'n., 2002 UT App 164, f^6, 
48 P.3d 252 (further citations omitted). 
Pursuant to the plain language of Section 41-6-44(6), a defendant may be charged 
with a third degree felony for driving under the influence where the case involves "a 
third or subsequent conviction [for DUI] within ten years of two or more prior 
convictions." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i). The plain language of Subsection 
(6)(a) requires, then, that a defendant must be twice convicted of a DUI related offense 
within ten years in order to qualify for the enhanced DUI charge. Subsection (6)(a) does 
not, however, clarify whether the prior convictions must be in place at the time the third 
incident occurs in order to qualify for the enhanced DUI charge. 
While Section 41-6-44 contains a definition for "conviction," that definition fails 
to clarify whether the conviction must actually be in place at the time of the incident in 
order to qualify for an enhanced DUI charge. The pertinent portions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44(l)(a) define "conviction" as: 
any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both - related reckless 
driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled 
substance that is taken illegally in the body; 
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(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination of both - related reckless driving adopted in 
compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(vi) a violation described in Subsection (l)(a)(i) through (v), which 
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any 
drug, or a combination of both - related reckless driving if 
committed in this state, including punishments administered under 
10U.S.C.Sec.815[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(l)(a). While Subsection (l)(a) indicates that a conviction for 
alcohol related reckless driving such as the conviction entered in the South Jordan case 
after this incident occurred qualifies for enhancement, Subsection (l)(a) does not clarify 
whether that conviction was required to have been in place when the incident occurred in 
order to qualify for an enhanced DUI charge. 
It is evident from the statute that the legislature intended that the penalty be 
enhanced for repeat DUI offenders. See. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a). To be a 
repeat offender, however, it would seem that a defendant must be found guilty and 
sentenced for multiple offenses prior to committing the new charge. See e.g. 
Commonwealth v. Dickerson. 590 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. 1991) (citing R. P. Davis, 
Chronological or Procedural Sequence of Former Convictions as Affecting Enhancement 
of Penalty for Subsequent Offense Under Habitual Criminal Statutes, 24 A.L.R. 1247 
(1952)) (the rule "that prior convictions must antedate commission of the principal 
offense to be eligible for application as sentence enhancers is, in fact, the majority rule in 
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this country . . .") . Because Mr. Pixton was not a repeat offender when he allegedly 
committed the crime in this case, the enhancement based on having two prior DUI 
convictions did not apply. 
In State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court considered 
whether the enhanced penalty for "a second or subsequent conviction1' for distribution of 
drugs offenses found in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(b) (1994) applied to multiple 
counts charged in a single information. The Court held that when multiple distribution 
offenses are charged in a single information, the second and subsequent counts may be 
enhanced under Section 58-37-8(l)(b). Hunt. 906 P.2d at 314. The Court reached that 
decision in part based on its conclusion that the language "upon a second or subsequent 
conviction" found in the distribution statute applied to any conviction regardless of 
whether the conviction was entered before or after the incident involved in the enhanced 
charge. Id at 313-14. 
The decision in Hunt does not control this issue, however, since it interpreted a 
different statutory provision with distinct language. Section 58-37-8(l)(b), interpreted in 
Hunt, states that any person convicted of violating Section 58-37-8(l)(a) is guilty of a 
certain level of crime "and upon second or subsequent conviction," is guilty of an 
enhanced crime. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(b). By contrast, Section 41-6-44(l)(a) 
states that a DUI conviction is a third degree felony "if it is . . . a third or subsequent 
conviction under this section within ten years of two or more convictions." Utah Code 
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Ann. § 41-6-44(l)(a). Since the variation in the language found in Section 41-6-
44(6)(a)(ii) does not contain the "upon . . . conviction" language found in the distribution 
enhancement statute, the DUI enhancement statute is subject to a different interpretation . 
Moreover, four years after the Supreme Court decided Hunt, it issued its decision 
in State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, 980 P.2d 191. Lopes held that the gang enhancement 
statute "created a specific new crime or a crime of a higher degree" and that each of the 
elements necessary for imposition of the enhanced sentence must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt to a jury. IdL at 15. Based on the constitutional protections of due 
process and the right to a jury trial, the Court concluded enhancements that increase the 
severity of punishment require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury of the 
elements necessary to establish the enhancement. IdL 
Pursuant to Lopes, the existence of two prior DUI related convictions is an 
element of the enhanced DUI crime that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a 
jury. If the convictions did not exist when the incident occurred, then the requisite 
element cannot be proven even if the defendant is later convicted of a DUI related 
offense. In other words, since the existence of two prior DUI related convictions is an 
element of the third degree felony enhanced DUI, the state cannot prove such element 
since Mr. Pixton did not have two prior DUI convictions when this crime was 
committed. See Dickerson, 590 A.2d at 771 ("a second offense, carrying with it a 
severer penalty is not, in legal contemplation committed" unless there has been a 
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conviction for the prior offense). The Supreme Court's decision in Lopes requires that 
an enhancement based on prior convictions is an element of the crime of enhanced DUI 
and suggests that the convictions must be in place when the crime is committed. 
A majority of jurisdictions require that any convictions used to enhance a charge 
be in place at the time of the incident. See e^ g. Dickerson, 590 A.2d at 771 (recognizing 
that requiring convictions to precede the commission of the principal offense in order to 
apply as enhancers is the majority rule); United States v. Wood, 209 F.3d 847 (6th Cir. 
2000) (defendant's prior conviction did not qualify as prior offense because it occurred 
after defendant committed primary offense); State v. Woody. 613 N.W.2d 215, 218 
(Iowa 2000) ("previous convictions [must] precede the commission of the current 
offense" in order to enhance the crime); Cynthia L. Sletto, Annotation, Chronological or 
Procedural Sequence of Former Convictions as Affecting Enhancement of Penalty Under 
Habitual Offender Statutes. 7 A.L.R. 5th 263, 289 (1992) (majority of jurisdictions 
require that conviction be in place prior to commission of a new crime for conviction to 
operate as an enhancer). The rationale for requiring that a conviction be in place prior to 
commission of a new crime is based not only on the fact that without such a requirement, 
a necessary element does not exist at the time of commission, but also on the idea that 
such enhanced penalties are directed at those who persist in criminal activity after being 
punished for such activity. 
"Legislation authorizing the imposition of increased punishment on 
recidivists is directed at those who persist in criminality after having once 
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been convicted of an offense. It is thus generally essential that the alleged 
conviction shall have preceded the date of the offense for which the 
increased punishment is sought to be imposed." 
Dickerson, 590 A.2d at 771 (quoting 39 Am. Jur.2d Habitual Criminal § 6); Woody . 613 
N.W.2d at 218 (recidivist statutes are aimed at "violators who have not responded to the 
restraining influence of conviction and punishment" and therefore only apply when 
conviction precedes commission of new crime) (internal citations omitted); but. see Hunt, 
906 P.2d at 312-13. If this statute were interpreted to allow enhancement even though 
one or more of the convictions was entered after the incident, the key to the charge would 
be the timing of the entry of convictions rather than the timing of the defendant's actions. 
Such an approach would encourage lengthy continuances of DUI matters. For example, 
in this case, had Mr. Pixton continued the South Jordan matter until after the Murray 
matter was resolved, the case would not have been elevated to a felony. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(ii). Had Mr. Pixton pled guilty to the class B DUI initially charged 
in this case and subsequently pled guilty to ARR in the South Jordan matter, both cases 
would have been resolved as misdemeanors. See. id (elevating convictions for 
qualifying DUFs to third degree felonies but not elevating subsequent convictions for 
ARR). Additionally, the statute would allow for an enhanced DUI charge even though 
the incidents involved in the "prior" convictions occurred after the incident charged as an 
enhanced DUI. For example, a defendant could be arrested for DUI and plead not guilty. 
Thereafter, he could be arrested for two DUIs and plead guilty to both at arraignment 
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before the initial DUI was resolved; under such circumstances, the initial DUI could be 
an enhanced DUI pursuant to the lower court's interpretation of the statute even though 
the initial DUI was committed when the defendant had no other offenses. 
Moreover, the statute as interpreted below fails to give adequate notice as to the 
circumstances under which the enhancement applies; this failure to give adequate notice 
violates due process. See State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159, 164 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) 
("Due process requires the state to provide fair notice to its citizens of prohibited conduct 
and potential consequences flowing from such conduct"); Grayned v. City of Rockford . 
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (a statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due 
process if it fails to provide a "person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited . . .") . The language of the statute does not tell a person of 
ordinary intelligence that he can be convicted of an enhanced DUI even though he does 
not have two prior DUI convictions at the time of the crime. Because statutes must be 
interpreted to meet constitutional constraints whenever it is possible (see Intermountain 
Slurry SeaL 2002 UT App 164, %6), Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) must be read to 
require entry of convictions prior to the incident being charged. Otherwise, a defendant 
is not put on notice that he could be charged with an enhanced DUI even though he did 
not have two or more prior convictions within ten years at the time of the incident. 
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At the time the incident alleged in this case occurred, Mr. Pixton had only one 
prior DUI conviction within the ten previous years. The statute failed to give Mr. Pixton 
adequate notice that he could be charged with an enhanced DUI even though he did not 
have two prior convictions at the time of the incident. Indeed, the vagueness and lack of 
notice that an enhanced DUI applies even though two convictions were not in place at 
the time of the incident is highlighted by the fact that Mr. Pixton, who was represented 
by counsel, pleaded guilty to the South Jordan count and was sentenced even though the 
DUI in this case was pending. It is unlikely that Mr. Pixton would have accepted the 
plea bargain in the South Jordan case had the statute given adequate notice that 
acceptance of that plea bargain would subject him to an enhanced DUI charge on his 
other pending case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) allows for an enhanced DUI charge when a 
defendant has two prior DUI related convictions. The language of the statute and due 
process concerns require that the two prior convictions must be in place when the crime 
is committed for the state to prove the element of two prior convictions and to give 
notice as to the prohibited conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Neil Steven Pixton respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the decision of the trial court, hold that Section 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) requires that 
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prior convictions used for enhancement be in place when the crime is committed, and 
remand the case to allow Mr. Pixton to withdraw his conditional plea. 
SUBMITTED this 36^ day of May, 2003. 
\jtU^ 0. uMfy 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
L. MONTE SLEIGHT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the 
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 
5th Floor, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the 
Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 
6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this Scu day of May, 
2003. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of May, 2003. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEIL STEVEN PIXTON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 021908726 FS 
Judge: ANN BOYDEN 
Date: February 3, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: patd 
Prosecutor: BERNARDS-GOODMAN, KATHERINE 
Defendant 
Defendant*s Attorney(s): SLEIGHT, L. MONTE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 13, 1975 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 105939 
CHARGES 
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/09/2002 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 3 0 day(s) previously served. 
Page 1 
Case No: 
Date: 
021908726 
Feb 03, 2003 
SENTENCE FINE 
Large # 1 Fine : 
Suspended: 
Surcharge: 
Due: 
Total Fine: 
Total Suspended: 
Total Surcharge: 
Total Principal Due: 
$2000 
$0.00 
$921.11 
$2000.00 
$2000.00 
$0 
$921.11 
$2000.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
PAYMENTS PER AP&P 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LEGAL DEFENDER'S ASSOCIATION 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
PAYMENTS PER AP&P 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 2000.00 which includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Paqe 2 
Case No: 021908726 
Date: Feb 03, 2003 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Court orders that interlock system be installed on each motor 
vehicle owned or operated by the probationer, at probationer's 
expense. 
Calibration of interlock to be set at .00 or not to exceed .02 
pursuant to ignition interlock provider's recommendation. 
COMPLETE ODYSSEY HOUSE INPAT. PROGRAM & ANY AFTERCARE PROGRAM, DEFT 
MAY NOT DRIVE WHILE ON PROBATION UNLESS HAVE VALID DR LIC, 
INTERLOCK DEVICE TO BE INSTALL IF HAVE VALID DR LIC, NO ALCOHOL OR 
DRUGS, COMPLY WITH ALL TREATMENT PER AP&P, MAINTAIN FULLTIME 
EMPLOYMENT/SCHOOLING PER AP&P, 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768) 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
NEIL STEVEN PIXTON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, & ORDER DENYING DEFENSE 
MOTION TO REDUCE CHARGE 
Case No. 021909726 
/ 
Hon. Ann Boyden 
Through counsel, defendant Pixton filed a motion to reduce his "enhanced" driving under 
influence of alcohol (DUI) charge, a third degree felony based upon two prior convictions, to a 
class B misdemeanor. The issue was briefed, and on November 26, 2002, with defendant 
present, the parties' counsel orally argued the motion to this Court. The Court will now deny 
defendant's motion, based upon the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Based upon court documents and a letter from the Murray, Utah city prosecutor appended 
to the State's memorandum, the parties agree on these facts: 
1. In May, 1998, defendant Pixton pled guilty and was sentenced for DUI, a class B 
misdemeanor, in the Sandy, Utah justice of the peace court. 
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2. In January 2001, defendant was arrested for DUI in South Jordan, Utah, and that case was 
filed as a class B misdemeanor in the South Jordan justice of the peace court. 
3. On or atbout May 15, 2001, defendant was arrested for DUI in Murray, in the case that 
eventually was filed in this Court. However, this DUI was initially filed, by citation, in 
the Murray justice of the peace court as a class B misdemeanor, for prosecution by 
Murray City. 
4. On May 24, 2001, defendant pled guilty to "alcohol-related reckless" driving (ARR) in 
his South Jordan case, and was sentenced for that class B misdemeanor. 
5. Some time after entry of defendant's South Jordan ARR conviction, the Murray City 
prosecutor learned of that conviction. Accordingly, on or about December 3, 2001, the 
Murray prosecutor dismissed the class B DUI citation in Murray JP Court, and referred 
this case back to the arresting police agency for felony prosecution due to the two prior 
convictions, in the Sandy and South Jordan JP courts. 
6. On or about June 21, 2002, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office, representing the 
State, filed the Murray DUI case as felony DUI, now pending in this Court, basing the 
felony enhancement upon the Sandy and South Jordan prior DUI/ARR convictions. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The defense argues that this case cannot be prosecuted as a third degree felony, 
enhanced DUI, because "[a]t the time of filing the enhanced third degree felony charge, 
Mr. Pixton had been convicted of only one prior DUI under Section 41-6-44(6)" (Def. 
Mem. at 2). He further complains that application of the enhancement to this case 
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violates his constitutional due process right to notice (id. at 4).1 For the following 
reasons, this Court rejects the defense arguments: 
1. The defense does not dispute that defendant's 1998 Sandy DUI conviction may 
apply to enhance this case. 
2. The defense does not dispute that in general, a conviction for ARR, such as his 
May 24, 2001 South Jordan conviction, can apply to enhance a subsequent DUI 
conviction. See Utah Code § 41-6-44(l)(b)(ii) (2001). 
3. The DUI enhancement statute at issue in this case, section 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001), 
states that the enhancement applies upon a third "conviction" within the prescribed 
time period; it does not address dates of arrest, nor dates when charges are filed. 
4. A "conviction" can mean either an adjudication of guilt awaiting sentencing, or an 
adjudication of guilt plus the sentence imposed on that adjudication. In this 
particular case, the latter definition can apply, because at the time this case was 
withdrawn from the Murray JP court and refiled by the State as an enhanced DUI, 
defendant had been twice previously adjudicated and sentenced for DUI and ARR, 
respectively. 
5. Because defendant had been twice previously convicted of DUI/ARR when this 
case was filed as an enhanced DUI, the State legitimately filed this case as an 
enhanced DUI. 
Defendant also argues that the State, at trial, must prove the prior convictions beyond reasonable doubt. The State 
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6. Because the enhancement statute plainly states that prior convictions trigger the 
enhancement, there is no constitutional "notice" violation in the application of the 
enhancement to this case. 
7. The State argues, in the alternative, that under State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311 (Utah 
1995), defendant would be subject to the enhancement even under the definition of 
"conviction" as a guilt adjudication without sentencing. Although this Court need 
not address this argument, this Court notes that appellate guidance on this issue 
would be helpful to the trial courts, in our efforts to fairly and consistently apply 
the DUI enhancement statute. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's motion to 
reduce this enhanced DUI charge to a misdemeanor is denied. 
DATED this /£& day of ?&& , 20C^ 
/f 
Akvu^ fe&Zfe&Z^ 
ANNBOYDEN 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: y? X / 
^/A 
Attorneyfor Defendant 
does not dispute this proposition. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER was delivered to the following, this day of 
, 200g" 
L. Monte Sleight 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Kevin Murphy 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM C 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
a combination of both or with specified or unsafe 
blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of 
blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment 
— Arrest without warrant — Penalties — Sus-
pension or revocation of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless 
driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled 
substance that is taken illegally in the body; 
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or 
a combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance 
with Section 41-6-43; 
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(vi) a violation described in Subsections (l)(a)(i) through (v), which 
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, 
or a combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this 
state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(b) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a 
substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance 
Abuse in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and 
dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse 
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse in accordance 
with Section 62A-8-107; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a sub-
stance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse 
in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed sub-
stance abuse program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordi-
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test 
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater at the time of operation or actual physical control. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (2) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 
years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third 
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon 
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
48 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (4)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance 
abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order 
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood 
alcohol level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the 
person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a 
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the per o n to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
240 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (5)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance 
abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony 
if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten 
years of two or more prior convictions; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is com-
mitted after July 1, 2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after 
July 1, 2001. 
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of 
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of 
this section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution 
of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring 
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse 
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive 
care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-
through after treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the 
court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which 
may include requiring the person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection 
(13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may 
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
18) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in a 
screening and assessment; and an educational series; obtain, in the 
discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandato-
rily, substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things, 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and 
assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in 
connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under 
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would 
render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or 
subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to: 
(i) complete all court ordered: 
(A) screening and assessment; 
(B) educational series; 
(C) substance abuse treatment; and 
(D) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or 
(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treat-
ment costs. Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend 
the person's driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-
221(2) and (3). 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a 
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, 
including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, 
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with 
the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction 
of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted 
for the first time under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior 
conviction as defined under Subsection (1) if the violation is commit-
ted within a period of ten years from the date of the prior violation; 
and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the 
court under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or 
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension 
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is 
based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation 
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 
days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those 
persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this 
Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License 
Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for 
a specified period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall 
alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law en-
forcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of 
the person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may 
be monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection 
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install 
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other 
specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to in-
clude a substance abuse testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during 
the time the person is subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person 
to attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel 
directly between those activities and the person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement 
if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be 
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation 
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers 
by the court under Subsection (13)(c)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or 
Subsection (4j(e) or (5Xe): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by 
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation 
provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor 
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, 
conditions of probation, and court orders received under this article and 
shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that 
sentence or those conditions or orders. 
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with 
probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14Kb) shall 
cover the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is 
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, 
then if the court does not order: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4Hd\ C5Xd), or (6)(d), then 
the court shall enter the reasons on the record; and 
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the 
record: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of 
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of elec-
tronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
